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Abstract: Accumulation of high levels of convertible currency has been a robust trend among emerging 
countries in the recent years. In this paper we investigate the rationale behind reserves accumulation in 
Brazil. Specifically, we ask: have the Central Bank of Brazil’s interventions in the exchange market been 
better supported by the mercantilist thesis or by the precautionary view? Our findings suggest that 
monetary authorities’ market interventions do not seem to be related to ‘fear of floating’ concerns, this 
finding is in contrast with the mercantilist view that Brazil manages its foreign exchange rate. 
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Resumo: Nos últimos anos, a acumulação de elevados níveis de reservas em moedas conversíveis por 
parte de países emergentes tem se revelado uma tendência dominante. Este trabalho investiga a 
racionalidade por detrás da acumulação de reservas no Brasil. Mais especificamente, questiona-se se as 
intervenções do Banco Central são explicadas pela tese mercantilista ou pela visão precaucional. As 
evidências encontradas sugerem que as intervenções não parecem estar associadas ao “medo de flutuar”, 
o que contrasta com a perspectiva mercantilista. 
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Introduction 
Monetary authorities in several emerging countries have been recently intervening in foreign 
currency markets. As a consequence, a large build up of international reserves has been an impressive 
tendency amongst the main emerging countries in the last decade, especially in the few last years. This 
evidence raised the hypothesis that many emerging countries may have hidden aims for their economic 
policies. For example, an unofficial exchange rate would be targeted, instead of allowing a legitimate free 
floating exchange regime to be effectively in place. The trend has recently gained some relevance in 
economic debates, especially related to the side effects associated with the enlargement of sovereign 
wealth funds among those countries. As a common recent feature, Asian economies and Middle East oil 
exporters have run up large current-account surpluses, piling up foreign reserves, mostly in American 
Treasury securities, in order to prevent their currencies from rising.  
The broadening of precautionary demand for reserves by several emerging countries has marked 
their macroeconomic strategies since the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1997-8) financial crises (Aizenman 
et al., 2004, Dooley et al., 2004, Eichengreen, 2004). This means that adopting free floating exchange 
rate regimes among those countries, in the aftermath of this sequence of financial crises, has not been 
sufficient to manage their external transactions. Purchases of foreign currency may actually constitute a 
response to two extreme and closely linked concerns: (i) the search for reducing external vulnerability, 
via broadening the potential capacity in sustaining external liquidity through the increase of official 
reserves; and (ii) the ‘fear of floating’, i.e., the attempt of sustaining the exchange rate in a level other 
than the one which would be expected if only competitive conditions existed in exchange markets. As it is 
well-recognized among economists, in a pure free floating exchange regime, monetary authorities do not 
need to keep foreign reserves. Nevertheless, recent literature has suggested that, in the context of 
deregulated global finance, the precautionary demand for reserves may constitute a national strategy. On 
the other hand, many economies, especially in the East Asia, seem to be running export-led growth 
regimes via robust and steady exchange market interventions and accumulation of foreign reserves.  
This paper revisits this debate specifically in relation to Brazil. We focus on the rationale for the 
accumulation of reserves in Brazil in the recent period. More specifically, we ask if, firstly, the adoption 
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of a free floating regime had affected the policy of accumulation of reserves, modifying the pattern of 
interventions of the monetary authority in the exchange markets. Secondly, if the reserves are associated 
to the mercantilist thesis or is more related to the precautionary view, and finally if the reserves have been 
the substitute for capital controls. The paper is structured in four main sections. Initially, it investigates 
the actual stage of the research on reserves demand theory, emphasizing the mercantilist and 
precautionary thesis and the main empirical works. Section 3 examines the hypothesis of ‘fear of floating’ 
in Brazil, following Souza & Hoff (2003)’s procedures. Section 4 presents the econometric exercises to 
estimate the reserves’ determinants, also including the analysis of the financial liberalization hypothesis. 
Main findings and concluding remarks are summarized afterwards. 
 
2. The literature on international reserves: a brief review on the reserves’ demand theory and the 
empirical findings  
  Literature on international reserves has been identified since the 1960s and 1970s, when reserves 
were demanded to control the exchange rate arrangements that characterized the so-called Bretton Woods 
system. At that time, the ‘buffer’ function of international reserves to smooth the balance of payments’ 
variations (mainly related to current account unbalances) constituted the main motive underlying this 
common feature of the external policy
3. Recently, this literature has regained relevance, following the 
ongoing movement of accumulating high levels of foreign currency among the emerging countries. 
However, the approach is distinct from the previous studies. Reserves are now seen as a mean to reduce 
the incidence of international crises, a new feature of the actual international financial architecture. In this 
sense, reserves have lost their own function of working as a mechanism to absorb transitory disequilibria 
in the current account. New tasks seem to be in place, enhanced by the fact that the exchange rate 
mechanism, once supposed to adjust the unbalancing capital flows, have not been effectively in place to 
clear the balance of payments and avoid the maintenance of reserve positions.  
Reserves today constitute sovereign assets affecting the exposure of a developing country to the 
sovereign-risk and cost adjusts (Aizenman et al., 2005). A lesson following the financial crises, 
prescribed by Aizenman, Lee & Rhee (2004) is that monetary authorities should carefully observe capital 
flows and stick the level of international reserves to their short-term external liabilities (Greenspan, 1999, 
Ggidotti, Sturzenegger & Villar, 2004). Financial crises of the 1990s have unveiled the limited access of 
emerging countries to international credit lines, suggesting this other important function of international 
reserves. They may indeed be seen as a precautionary savings to economies with conditional access to 
global capital markets – a self-protection via liquidity increasing, which may also reduce the cost of 
external credit for an emerging country (Rodrik, 2006). The imperfect integration, related to sovereign-
risk, turns the accumulation of precautionary reserves a welfare-improving policy (Feldstein, 1999).  
Therefore, one focus of empirical literature understand accumulating reserves as a mechanism for 
product stabilization and international crisis’ risk reduction, as Ben-Bassat & Gottlieb (1992), Bussiere & 
Mulder (1999)
4, Aizenman, Lee & Rhee (2004), García & Soto (2004), Jeanne & Rancière (2006), and 
Aizenman & Lee (2006)
5. Furthermore, reserves affect not only the probability of a crisis, but also the 
associated costs. Depending on how reserves are used, and in the case when the origin of a crisis is a 
liquidity shock, grand sums of international reserves may allow countries to avoid cost assets liquidation. 
By the same token, Rodrik (2006) asserts that countries with high levels of reserves are more capable to 
deal with panics on financial markets and sudden reversals on capital flows, reducing not only costs but 
the probability of such events. By their turn, De Gregorio & Lee (2004) find a significant effect of self-
liquidity – seized as the ratio of reserves related to domestic liabilities (M2) and to short-term debt – in 
reducing the cost of a crisis on balance of payments.  
In the beginning of the 21st century, the huge volume of international liquidity and the facility that 
financial flows move abroad from one country to another indicate the deepening globalization of the 
markets in relation to the 1990s, partially explaining the reasoning for huge reserve holdings. This 
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corroborates the hypothesis that nowadays emerging countries are still subjected, if not more, to financial 
crises’ side effects, affecting all markets more or less developed, even though it may be difficult to 
measure the probability of occurrence and the size of the next liquidity shock. As Loyola (2007) 
emphasizes, the actual financial globalization is not comparable to any previous moment in the economic 
history, especially counting with intensive use of financial innovations, a new challenge to economic 
management. In this context, De Gregorio & Lee (2004), and Park & Lee (2002), among others, have 
showed that the costs of financial crises are associated to loss of product. Indeed, real product growth 
would follow a ‘V’ shape during the period before and after financial crises. However, the post-crisis 
growth rate does not exceed the pre-crisis average, unveiling that crises involve permanent losses in terms 
of GDP. Even the ‘Asian tigers’ of the 1990s were not immune to short-term capital’s sudden stops
6. 
Eichengreen (2006, p.12), in the same way, point that investment rate in emerging Asian economies 
except China (and maybe India) has been kept significantly bellow 1996 levels, even ten years after the 
Asian crisis. This would contrast with the formation of excessive savings kept in international reserves, 
given the risk aversion of financial crises on those countries. 
In Brazil, academic research in this field is still restrict
7. We have identified only one study 
specific addressing international reserves. Lopes (2005) evaluates the effectiveness of reserves as a 
‘shield’ against sudden stops. His conclusion is that the stock of reserves reduces the probability of 
occurrence of crises but, once started, it would tend to be stronger than in the case of lack of international 
reserves. Reserves would tend to accentuate the falling of capital flows during crises. A parallel study is 
Hoff (2004), who analyses the determinants of the monetary authority’s intervention on the exchange 
market in floating regimes. Her main conclusion is that the misalignments of the real exchange rate have 
triggered the interventions that took place starting in the middle of 1999.  
At the same time, this line of research faces a serious concurrent thesis. Part of the literature 
considers the policy of accumulating reserves as a mechanism to improve exports competitiveness, which 
would require the monetary authority to manage more actively the exchange market. Initially proposed by 
Dooley  et al. (2003), this view interprets reserves accumulation as stemming from the market 
interventions to avoid the appreciation of the domestic currency. China would be the hour concurs 
example in this view, but also it’s applied to other Asian developing economies that follow similar 
external policies. Aizenman & Lee (2006), Hviding, Novak & Ricci (2004), Dooley et al (2003) and 
European Central Bank (2006) follow this approach in analyzing international reserves as a mercantilist 
policy’s mechanism. IMF (2003) also recognizes the relevance of the mercantilist policy to explain the 
strategy of accumulating reserves among the Asian emerging economies. Therefore, while the 
precautionary approach link directly the accumulation of reserves to the exposure to sudden stops, capital 
flight and volatility, mercantilist’s view it as a residual of an industrial policy, which can, at the same 
time, impose side externalities to other export countries (Aizenman & Lee, 2005). Nevertheless, Flood & 
Marion (2002)’s explanation for the recent tendency of accumulation of high levels of international 
reserves not only in the emerging world but also in the developed ones, is based on the own international 
scenario of excess of liquidity.  
That is the context within which we develop our analysis on the rationale for exchange market 
interventions and the building of international reserves in Brazil. Our main objective is to identify 
evidences supporting the relevance of the claims of the precautionary versus mercantilist motives 
underpinning the external policy of the country. In the next section, we start off investigating the 
hypothesis of the presence of ‘fear of floating’ underlying the monetary authority’s interventions in the 
exchange market. 
 
3. Central Bank’s interventions in the exchange market: is there ‘fear of floating’ in Brazil?
8 
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  Brazil has officially adopted a free floating exchange regime in 1999, falling in line with the then 
tendency among several emerging countries in abandoning strictly fixed exchange regimes after the 
monetary crisis that have hit the region since the middle 1990s. Nevertheless, intermediate or more 
flexible regimes in the sense of allowing currencies to float pegged to a convertible or a currency 
composite basket has still predominated in the post-Bretton Woods era
9. This hypothesis has been 
strengthened by the recent tendency identified among the East Asian countries, in administering exchange 
regimes more pronouncedly, practice also known as ‘dirty’ floating. Even though many countries may 
declare themselves running floating exchange regime, rigorously there is a huge gap between the declared 
(free floating) exchange regime and the current practice of administering and controlling the level and the 
volatility of the exchange rate. The debate over this phenomenon has been known in the literature as ‘fear 
of floating’. Even though in Brazil this practice cannot be considered so as expressive, the suspect still 
holds. Recently in March, 2008, Brazil has implemented some measures to avoid the excessive 
appreciation of the domestic currency and at least to relieve the pain on the competitiveness of the export 
sector
10.  
Indeed, the authorities have declared that their frequent interventions in the exchange market were 
done to stabilize the exchange market and avoid strong variations in the rate. Additionally, when an 
inflation targeting system is in place in a periphery economy as Brazil, the aim to control the exchange 
rate is usually a standard mechanism used as an ‘anchor’ to stabilizing prices. This characteristic is 
especially relevant when there is a high pass-through of the exchange rate to inflation, due to the high 
dependency of a country with abroad in terms of trade. Figure 1 gives support to the hypothesis that 
reserve holdings may be related to the ‘fear of floating’ hypothesis. Reserves have been accumulated in 
tandem with a reduction on the foreign exchange rate volatility. 
 























































































































































































Reserves Exchange rate variation  
  In this section we concentrate in investigating the hypothesis of ‘fear of floating’ as a guide to the 
recent exchange interventions’ policy of the Central Bank of Brazil, symptom that helps to identify (or 
not) the presence of a mercantilist view governing Brazilian external economic policy. Theoretically, an 
administered exchange rate regime presents lower exchange rate volatility coupled with greater volatility 
on reserves and interest rates, in comparison to countries such as the USA and Japan. Among the factors 
that justify the presence of fear of floating in emerging economies, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) describe 
that when circumstances are favorable (i.e., there are capital inflows), many countries can be reluctant in 
leaving nominal (and real) exchange rate to excessively appreciate, because it could mean a loss of 
competitiveness and diversification of tradeables’ export sector. 
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  Therefore, the standard procedure to verify this hypothesis involves the estimation of some 
indicators to be compared to those benchmark free floating regimes. Given this reference, we start 
comparing the Brazilian regime since 1999 to a group of other countries, mainly emergent, using the 
standard indicators used in previous estimations. We also construct indicators for the first phase of the 
Real Plan (1994-1998), to compare the actual stage to the experience of a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
this sense, we present two groups of indicators. First, following Calvo & Reinhart, the exchange rate, 
reserves and interest rate’s volatility are seized by the frequency on which monthly variations are between 
certain pre-defined limits. The second group is inspired by Hausmann et al. (2000), where volatilities are 
measured by the standard deviation and put in relative terms, i.e., comparing the exchange rate’s volatility 
in relation to the reserves and interest rates’ volatility. The underlying idea in these indicators is that, in a 
real floating exchange regime, exchange rate volatility is relatively high, while reserves and interest rates 
present relatively low volatility. The higher the frequency beyond the limits of 1% and 2.5%, the greater 
the variation of the exchange rate – and the closer a country is to a floating exchange rate regime.  
Table 1 is a slightly modified and updated version of the one Calvo & Reinhart (2000) constructed 
for his sample. Indicators were calculated for 1999-2007, for a group of economies including USA, Japan, 
Brazil and some other emerging Asian and Latin American countries that have adopted at least formally a 
floating exchange regime. Results are the frequency distribution of monthly variations of exchange rate. 
It’s noteworthy that the Brazilian experience after the implementation of the free floating exchange 
regime has presented variations much more expressive than the recorded ones among the central 
economies (USA, Euro area and Japan). While in average almost 90% of their exchange rate’s variation 
has been lower than 2.5%, Brazil has registered more than 50% of its variations higher than the interval of 
2.5%. At the same time, almost 90% of the interest rates’ monthly variations have been wider than 
0.25pp, in contrast with the verified average on those countries of more than 90% inside the 0.25pp 
interval. Reserves have been much more volatile in this period, reflecting the policy of accumulation of 
large amounts and all related sovereign payments abroad. This data allows two interpretations. Even 
though the large variations in interest rates and reserves than the benchmark regimes have not been 
predicted to hold for a free floating model, it’s not possible to conclude for the presence of ‘fear of 
floating’ in Brazil and reject the presence of a free floating regime, vis-à-vis the basic condition of larger 
exchange rate variations characterizing the Brazilian case is evident. Second, the larger volatility of 
interest rate and reserves may likely had been related to factors other than the ‘fear of floating’ concern. 
Even though the indicators for reserves and interest rates would not be expected to hold for a free floating 
exchange regime, they must be interpreted circumscribed to the relative differences of external insertion 
of the countries. Indeed, they have been much more pronounced in Brazil, as would be expected 
considering the institutional distinctions of a periphery economy in relation to the core ones. 
 
Table 1: Volatility of Reserves, Interest Rate and Exchange Rates (Jan/1999-Dez/2007). 
   Interest rate  Reserves  Exchange rate 
Country  F±0.25pp  F>±0.5pp  F±0.5pp   F±1% F±2.5%  F>±2.5% F±1% F±2.5%  F>±2.5% 
Latin American countries           
Argentina  6.94   61.11   38.89   50,00  95,37   4,63   36,11  65,28   34,72  
Bolivia  3.70  50.00   50.00   20,37  33,33   66,67   62,04  91,67   8,33  
Brazil  12.96   30.56   69.44   11,11  34,26   65,74   19,44  49,07   50,93  
Brazil (1)  10.63   76.60   23.40   24,07  50,00   50,00   20,37  100,00     -    
Chile  63.54   20.83   79.17   33,33  78,70   21,30   31,48   65,74   34,26  
Colombia  61.11   74.07   25.93   20,37  55,56   44,44   25,00   61,11   38,89  
Mexico  37.96   43.52  56.48  28,70  62,04   37,96   31,48  66,67   33,33  
Paraguay  25.00   63.89  36.11  27,78  72,22   27,78   37,04  71,30   28,70  
Peru  61.11   29.63  70.37   19,44  36,11   63,89   52,78  89,81   10,19  
Uruguay  14.81   74.07   25.93   67,59  93,52   6,48   43,52  73,15   26,85  
Venezuela  5.56    91.67   8.33   12,04  34,26   65,74   52,78  80,56   19,44  
Average  29.27  53.94  46.07 29.07 59.54  40.46 39.17 71.44  28.56 
Asian countries             
Indonesia  24.07   62.04  37.96  31,48  60,19   39,81   17,59  59,26   40,74  
Japan  100.00   0  100.00  38,89  82,41   17,59   39,81  80,56   19,44  
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Korea  95.37   2.78  97.22  57,41  82,41   17,59   44,44  80,56   19,44  
Malaysia  96.30   0.93  99.07  47,22  78,70   21,30   51,85  93,52   6,48  
Philippines  66.67   19.44  80.56   29,63  57,41   42,59   37,04  77,78   22,22  
Singapore  75.63   6.48  93.52  12,96  27,78   72,22   64,81  99,07   0,93  
Thailand  75.00  25.93  74.07 50.93 81.48  18.52 51.85 85.18  14.82 
Average 76.15  16.8  83.2  38.36  67.2  32.8  43.91  82.27  17.72 
BRIC               
Russia  13.89  77.48   22.22   25,93  60,19   39,81   68,52  87,96   12,04  
India  26.32   68.42  31.58  56,07  87,85   12,15   47,22  88,89   11,11  
China  96.36   3.64  96.36   35,19  68,52   31,48   58,33   94,44   5,56  
Anglo-saxon countries               
USA  86.11   3.70  96.30   46,30  83,33   16,67   60,19  94,44   5,56  
Sth Africa  62.96   15.74  84.26   61,11  93,52   6,48   25,93  50,93   49,07  
Canada  81.48   1.85   98.15   22,22  41,67   58,33   38,89   77,78   22,22  
Australia   74.07   0    100.00  14,81  34,26   65,74   25,93  67,59   32,41  
Euro Area  93.52   0.93   99.07   33,33  85,19   14,81   53,27  88,79   11,21  
Obs. Argentina: jan/02-dez/07; Brazil (1): jul/94-dez/98, fixed exchange rate regime.  
Exchange rate: average in the period. Thailand: end of period. Source: IFS (IMF) 
 
    The distinction of the actual floating regime in Brazil with the previous fixed one is also 
noteworthy. As figure 2b shows, exchange rates have started to flow after 1999, corroborating the 
existence of a real free floating exchange regime. In this sense, Brazilian exchange rate regime seems to 
have evolved to a de fact more volatile regime, which characterizes a floating regime. So, the hypothesis 
of ‘fear of floating’ does not hold on these terms, vis-à-vis there is a much more volatile exchange rate 
regime detached from the previous stability. Interest rate, by its turn, seems also to follow a more stable 
pattern after 1999. This evidence is in accordance with the different phases of the economic policy in 
practice: in the first period, interest rates were used to calibrate the balance of payments while exchange 
rate was a mechanism to control prices’ volatility; in the second term, interest rates are the mechanism to 
control inflation, while exchange rate is the official instrument to equilibrate the balance of payments. 
Reserves, meanwhile, does not seem to present huge changes in its pattern (figure 2a). Even though 
reserves had been, in average, slightly more stable during the administered period, a volatile standard has 
been kept even during the following free floating regime.  
 







































































































































































































































































































Source of gross data: Ipeadata.gov.br. 
 
We complement the investigation at this stage with another set of indicators. Table 2 reports two 
relative volatility tests, based on Hausmann et al. (2000)’s tests11. The following indicators seize the 
relative volatilities between exchange rate and reserves, as well as between exchange and interest rates. 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that volatility indicators may be sensitive to the respective initial levels of reserves and interest rates. Countries 
more prone to suffer from ‘fear of floating’ may tend to keep higher levels of reserves. In this case, relatively volume exchange market 
interventions tend to be underestimated when seized in terms of the ratio of absolute variations relative to the levels of reserves. The same 
may occur related to the level of exchange rates. 
Δ Exchange rate Δ reserves reserves
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Exchange and interest rates’ volatility are measured by its standard deviation, while reserves’ volatility is 
captured by the coefficient of variation. In this context, if the ‘fear of floating’ is real and a country is 
trying to keep its exchange rate stable or is following a crawling peg, the standard deviation will tend to 
zero. Observing the relationship between exchange and interest rates’ volatilities, the higher the tendency 
of the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate via interest rates, the lower this ratio will be. Brazilian 
experience with an administered exchange rate regime until 1999, when interest rate’s volatility was the 
instrument to balance external flows and keep the exchange rate stable, presented a ratio of 0.0765, lower 
than the benchmark USA’s ratio (0.1940). Argentina (0.0247), Bolivia (0.0650), India (0.0081), Paraguay 
(0.0521), Peru (0.0796), Russia (0.0314), Singapore (0.0704), Uruguay (0.0903) and Venezuela (0.0474) 
are all developing countries which seem to present a stable exchange rate regime similar to the 
characteristics of the previous Brazilian experience. These are countries where ‘fear of floating’ concerns 
may play a role. 
The second relative indicator on table 2 is regarded to the reserves’ variations. The higher the 
tendency of the central bank to use them to stabilize the exchange rate, the lower the ratio of exchange 
rate and reserves’ volatility. Again, results are not conclusive, and the same shortcomings for the previous 
indicators must be considered. Great accumulators of reserves presented lower values for this indicator: 
China (0.0175), India (0.0273), Japan (0.0512), Korea (0.0542), Malaysia (0.0306), Russia (0.0155) and 
Singapore (0.0522), reflecting, at least partially, the large accumulation of reserves in this period. Other 
emerging economies such as Philippines (0.0938), Mexico (0.0981), Peru (0.0551), besides the Euro Area 
(0.1040), all seem to run a more stable exchange regime than the American one. In this case, results may 
not disregard the hypothesis of ‘fear of floating’ playing a role in these economies. On the other extreme, 
Chilean regime (0.6092) seems to be more volatile than the American benchmark (0.1690). Brazil, during 
its administered regime, presented a value of 0.0985, while after 1999 it achieved 0.1535. That is to say, 
Brazil seems to be running a much more flexible exchange regime than before 1999, quite similar to the 
genuine floating exchange regime in the USA. This result, different from the majority of the emerging 
economies, does not support the relevance of ‘fear of floating’ conducting Brazilian monetary authority’s 
market interventions. 
Table 2: Exchange rate’s volatility relative to interest rate & reserves (jan/99-dez/07) 
Country  θ's σ/i's σ    θ's σ/res' var  
Argentina     0,0247       0,2111  
Australia     1,0750       0,0568  
Bolivia     0,0650       0,0195  
Brazil     1,5448       0,1535  
Brazil (1)     0,0765       0,0985  
Canada     0,3802       0,1598  
Chile     0,1102       0,6092  
China   -       0,0175  
Colombia     0,4798       0,1337  
Euro Area     0,3608       0,1040  
India     0,0081       0,0273  
Indonesia     0,1765       0,2729  
Japan     0,0152       0,0512  
Korea     0,7441       0,0542  
Malaysia     0,3260       0,0306  
Mexico     0,3401       0,0981  
Paraguay     0,0521       0,0841  
Peru     0,0796       0,0551  
Philippines     0,4386       0,0938  
Russia     0,0314       0,0155  
Singapore     0,0704       0,0522  
South Africa     1,2439       0,0717  
United States     0,1940       0,1690  
Uruguay     0,0903       0,1459  
Venezuela     0,0474       0,2078  
  7 
Obs. Time span for Argentina since 2002, when a floating regime 
has been introduced. 
  For such, the main conclusion of this section is that, different from the majority of Asian and Latin 
American countries, Brazil has passed the tests, in the sense that the hypothesis of the presence of ‘fear of 
floating’ sustaining the exchange rate policy does not hold for the actual exchange regime in Brazil. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the exchange fluctuations have not constituted a priority 
concern to the Brazilian authorities, result similar to Souza & Hoff (2003). This agrees with the fact that 
many researchers have pointed that Central Bank of Brazil seems to accept an appreciation bias of the 
Real. Volatility on the exchange rate related to the appreciation of the domestic currency seems to be 
welcomed in the Brazilian recent experience, as it constitutes an additional instrument for its institutional 
mission of targeting inflation
12. This means that monetary authorities’ market interventions do not seem 
to be related to ‘fear of floating’ concerns. This finding is in contrast with the mercantilist view that 
Brazil manages its foreign exchange rate, and we should look for additional hypothesis to explain the 
building of reserves in Brazil. In the next section, we keep our inquiry on the reasons underlying the 
interventions in the exchange markets and the pattern of the Brazilian international reserves, testing the 
mercantilist view with additional techniques. 
 
4. The rationale of the Central Bank of Brazil’s interventions in the exchange market/ 
Determinants of the Brazilian reserves: some econometric evidences
13 
  In this Section we evaluate empirically the management of international reserves by the Brazilian 
monetary authority. Given the main previous conclusion that the hypothesis of ‘fear of floating’ does not 
hold to explain the actual interventions of the monetary authority in the Brazilian exchange market, we 
keep focused on investigating additional hypothesis explaining the rationale of the Central Banks of 
Brazil’s policy. We examine three main relevant aspects. First, has the adoption of a free floating regime 
in 1999 affected the policy of accumulation of reserves, modifying the pattern of interventions of the 
monetary authority in the exchange markets? Or, is it a relevant determinant of the Central Bank’s actions 
in the exchange market? Second, what is the main rationale for the Central Bank’s policy of accumulation 
of high levels of international currency? Have the reserves been more associated to the mercantilist thesis 
or to the precautionary view? We also try to answer if the reserves have been the substitute for capital 
controls that were gradually put away in the external management of Brazilian economy since the 1990s, 
given the particular dynamism of the financial account commanding the external insertion of the Brazilian 
economy. We examine if financial liberalization has imposed an upward tendency to the reserves policy, 
investigating the correlation of and the causality between both time series.  
  We first illustrate some factors that are behind the accumulation of international reserves in the 
aftermath if the introduction of the floating exchange regime in 1999 by taking a look at the evolution of 
international reserves and other related macroeconomic variables. International reserves were USD 33 
billion (in terms of usable amount) in March, 1999, but gradually built up to USD 198 billion by the end 
of May, 2008. As a fraction of GDP, international reserves rose from 4.32% to 14.46% over the same 
period. A swift glance at the plotted data (figure 3) indicates that direct investment has been the most 
relevant inflow since 1995, when Brazil was already gradually opening its capital account, pushed by the 
then privatization process that took place more firmly during the first term of Cardoso (1995-1998). More 
recently, the recovery of the export sector allowed Brazil register a current account surplus after the large 
depreciation of Real following the sudden stop and reversal of capital inflows associated to the victory of 
a leftwing candidate for the presidency in 2002. In 2007, large portfolio inflows coupled with continued 
inflows of foreigners’ direct investment and also other net investments, played an important role in the 




                                                 
12 See, e.g., Diniz (2006). 
13 We follow closely the investigatory strategy of Azeinmann et al (2004). 
  8 





































































































































































































Current Account Portfolio Direct Invest Other Inv Reserves  
Source of gross data: www.bcb.gov.br; Reserves: accumulated stock. Other series: 12 month moving average net flows. 
 
  In order to assess more formally the responsiveness of international reserves to those factors noted 
above, we run a reduced-form regression. The regressions relate changes in international reserves to 
monthly variations of the current account, direct investments, portfolio and other investment of the 
financial account of the balance of payments (table 3). We have included Other Investments in the 
regression. The series is statistically significant and its contribution improves a lot R
2. All components 
presented parameters statistically identified at 1% level, and DW statistic indicates no serial correlation 
on residuals on model II. However, White test reject the hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity on the 
stochastic disturbances. To solve this problem, the estimations of the coefficient covariances were 
corrected using the White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator (model III). In this 
sense, classical assumptions related to the stochastic component are all valid in this specification, 
allowing for more statistically robust results. We have also run the omitted variable test for this time 
series, corroborating model III. This kind of test helps to evaluate the early hypothesis that these flows 
would not contribute significantly to the pattern of international reserves.  
  Granger causality tests support these findings. Running bivariate Granger causality tests, we’ve 
examined if lagged values of a variable y  precede another given x  variable. As variables do not 
cointegrate two by two, according to Granger et al. (1998), we have used the conventional formulation for 
the Granger test. Basically, the relation between reserves and other investment flows has been the most 
significant. Reserves variations precede other investment variations and other investment variations 
cause, in the Grange meaning, reserves, at normal levels of significance. Given other investments 
comprise many short term flows, specially related to international trade that the Central Bank of Brazil 
historically has closely monitored and sometimes, when external funding ceased it substituted them to 
keep funding the exports; even more, due to the fact that the credits and debts with the IMF flow from 
reserves to/from abroad via this account, this finding seems to be very plausible. At a similar token, 
Granger causality tests reinforce the direction of causation from portfolio and current account balances to 
reserves, stating that the opposite direction does not hold.  Given the positive coefficient for each variable 
and the accumulation of reserves, this means the Central Bank of Brazil is purchasing the excess of 
foreign currency inflows provided by these accounts. The same conclusion holds for direct investment 
and reserves, as direct investment flows help to explain reserves variations
14 . 
 
Table 3: Reduce Form Equations 
Dependent variable: D(Res)     
Sample (adjusted): 1995M02 2008M04     
   model I  model II  model III 
Variable Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CASA  0.635180*  4,028086   0.900671*  16,3542   0.900671*  8,5047  
DIR_INVESTSA  0.372943*  2,761449  0.968957*  19,4233   0.968957*  28,0233  
PORTFOLIOSA  0.982336*  8,909103  0.992497*  33,9162   0.992497*  40,0643  
                                                 
14 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
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OTHERINVSA   -   -  0.907274*  23,7616   0.907274*  12,6189  
Adjusted R
2 0.339454  0.921057  0.921057 
DW 1,863284  2,059989  2,059989 
Schwarz   19,18415  17,08526  17,08526 
Notes: Series are all stationary (ADF, PP & ZA unit root tests). Other investment inflows comprise loans, trade credits, currency and deposits 
transfers, and the IMF’s loans, following the IMF’s methodology for Balance of Payments, adopted in Brazil. * Coefficient significant at 1% 
level. The inclusion of a constant was not significant in the model. The suffix SA denotes series were seasonally adjusted (method of the 
difference from moving average).  
 
  The dynamic of the Brazilian international reserves have been directly related to the patterns of 
these main accounts of the balance of payments, as would be expected. Specifically, a 1.0 (one) dollar 
increase in the current account surplus led to a 0.90 dollar increase in international reserves, the same 
occurring with the same variation on Other Investments. Direct Investments, which may present inflows 
not in currency but in machinery or even the conversion of previous external loans, presents a factor of 
0.96, while portfolio flows, achieved 0.99. This exercise does not confirm our prior conjecture that the 
result of the stock of international reserves is not significantly associated with the current account 
performance. In fact, this result is simply explained in terms of accounting. Since all international 
transactions must be registered in the balance of payments of the country with abroad, the surplus or 
deficit of these transactions must be reflected on the international reserves, vis-à-vis it supplies or absorb 
the lack or excess of convertible currency that is required as the result of the private transactions in the 
Brazilian exchange market. When outflows predominate, reserves tend to decrease in the same pace, the 
opposite being true as well. Statistically confirmed the relevance of the result on each account of the 
balance of payments to explain the pattern of the international reserves, to determine which flow has been 
predominant to allow for the accumulation of reserves one should look to their absolute results.  
  We now formally investigate
15 which underlying thesis may better explain the demand for 
international reserves in Brazil. Even though the presence of ‘fear of floating’ has not been supported by 
evidence, does the rationale of exchange interventions find any support on the mercantilist thesis? Or had 
the precautionary thesis played a bigger role in the rapid accumulation of international reserves? What 
about the precautionary thesis? We start modeling by recognizing the existence of five key factors that 
explain reserve holdings: economic size; current account vulnerability; capital account vulnerability; 
exchange rate flexibility; and opportunity cost (IMF, 2003, p.80/1). Our empirical model incorporates a 
set of explanatory variables to include measures for each of these determinants. Growth of population and 
real GDP per capita are expected to increase reserves. A more open economy is expected to be more 
vulnerable to external shocks, so greater trade openness would be associated with higher reserve holdings 
(IMF, 2003, p.81). The larger the external shocks (say, export volatility), the higher the level of reserves. 
At the same time, if the monetary authority’s interventions are related to the mercantilist thesis, exports’ 
growth must be positively correlated to reserves, vis-à-vis the higher the exports proceeds demanding 
higher purchases by the central bank. As with the current account, greater financial openness expounds an 
economy to higher crisis vulnerability and thus may influence the demand for reserves. In addition, the 
greater the potential for resident-based capital flight from the domestic currency, the higher the level of 
reserves. Meanwhile, greater flexibility is theoretically expected to reduce the demand for reserves, 
because central banks no longer need a large stockpile of reserves to manage a pegged exchange rate. 
However, many countries adopting more flexible exchange rate regimes (including managed floats) have 
kept accumulating large sums of reserves, and appear reluctant to allow much actual variability, giving 
rise to the literature connect to the mercantilist view.  
Consequently, focusing on the exchange rate may provide complementary information, and point 
to a direct relationship between exchange rate volatility (higher during the floating regime) and 
accumulation of reserves (higher in the recent past), as would be empirically expected for Brazil. If a 
country runs a dirty regime and manipulates the exchange rate to achieve or maintain international 
competitiveness, interventions in exchange market are expected to avoid real appreciation of the domestic 
currency. If this is the case, deviations from PPP would unveil an interventionist policy of the BCB, in the 
                                                 
15 This analysis builds on IMF (2003) and Aizenman, Lee & Rhee (2004). 
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mercantilist meaning
16. We measure the opportunity cost of holding reserves as the difference between 
the yield on reserves and the marginal productivity of an alternative investment. More specifically, the 
difference between American and Brazilian basic rate set by central bankers, in nominal and real terms. 
Theoretically, the greater the opportunity cost, the lower the level of reserves. Empirically, with interest 
rates hitting historical low levels in many central countries (IMF, 2003, p.81), the cost of holding foreign 
exchange reserves has likely increased for many emerging economies, including Brazil over the last few 
years, and may not be a robust determinant for the holding of large reserves actually. 
 
      Table 3: Regressions of Reserves on Explanatory Variables (1995m12-2008m4)  
      D(Reserves) 
Economic size   
D (Real GDP per capita)  20.72795 (3.88)* 
D(GDP)
 1 0.888593  (2.19)* 
Current account vulnerability   
D(Imports) 
1 2 6.46E-7  (1.26)# 
D(Trade openness)  108.0794 (0.58)# 
Export volatility 
2 3 0.051018  (0.87)# 
D(Exports) 
 2 3 4 0.000537  (0.85)# 
Capital account vulnerability   
D(Financial openness)  3.238871 (0.23)# 
D(Broad money/ GDP)  -812.2554 (-0.76)# 
Exchange rate flexibility   
D(Deviation from PPP) 
4 5  68.87336  (1.39)# 
Real Exchange rate variation 
5 -256.0219  (-3.38)* 
Opportunity cost   
Nominal interest differential  -185.2659 (-3.91)* 
Real interest differential  -44.17559 (-0.95)# 
Notes: regressions include fixed effects, if not stated otherwise; numbers in parenthesis are t-
values. * denotes significance at 1% level; ** at 10% level; # not significant. Series were 
seasonally adjusted, using the difference from moving average method, available on Eviews 5.0. 
¹: constant not significant; 
2: lagged one period, to avoid current endogeneity; 
3: not significant 
even for the floating regime after 1999m1; 
4: export volatility is the monthly variation of 
exports, in %, while D(exports) stands for the monthly exports proceeds, in USD; 
5:  since 
1999m1. 
 
  Simple correlations between reserves and each of the explanatory variables present some results 
consistent with theoretical predictions (Table 3)
17. As expected, real reserves are positively and 
significantly correlated with real GDP per capita, even though the variations of GDP have not been robust 
to explain reserves policy. Reserves are correlated with the ratio of imports to GDP proxing current 
account vulnerability, but also not significantly. De facto, even though the formal rule governing the 
reserves policy in Brazil predicts the maintenance of the country’s imports capacity during an external 
turmoil
18, reserve holdings have accumulated much higher amounts of foreign currency
19. In this sense, 
formal rule and empirical practice seem to be unaligned. On the other hand, even though the other three 
indicators for current account vulnerability are not significant in acceptable levels, some comments are 
forward. The size of the international trade does not seem to be significant to explain reserves holdings in 
Brazil. As total exports and imports increase, one would expect reserves to (slightly) increase, given the 
precautionary concern related to imports capacity and the mercantilist view in support of exports. On the 
other hand, exports volatility per se has not constituted a robust relation with reserves, result that tends to 
weaken the mercantilist hypothesis.  
                                                 
16 PPP, in its simplest form, asserts that the rate of currency depreciation is approximately equal to the difference between domestic and 
foreign inflation rates. 
17 Time span defined according to available data. The explanatory variables used in the analysis are the empirical counterparts of the factors 
discussed above for which data are available.  
18 Resolution 82, 18/12/1990, by Federal Senate.  
19 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
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  The mechanism to sustain exports would be as follow: the greater exports proceeds tending to 
appreciate the domestic currency would be counterbalanced by the monetary authority mopping up the 
excess of liquidity in the exchange market. In theory, these interventions would keep the currency stable 
and sustain the export driver in a developing economy. So, the higher the exports, the higher the reserves, 
relation not verified in Brazil. Even though in absolute terms the accumulated time series has increased, 
abrupt month variations have been verified, especially after the floating exchange regime has been in 
place (figure 3). Given the appreciation of more than 100% of the domestic currency since 2003
20, the 
recovered dynamism of the export driver had steadily decayed in tandem with the appreciation of the 
exchange rate, pushing the current account back into deficit in 2008. Also, the potential of at least four 
thousand enterprises able to export has not been used, according to researchers in the Federal Economic 
Research Bureau (Araujo & De Negri, 2007). Together with the fact that several multinationals 
companies in Brazil have transferred their industrial production to abroad or simply stopped exporting, 
the robust side effects of running a free floating regime in a financially integrated scenario certainly does 
not support the mercantilist thesis playing a big role in Brazil.    
  Capital account vulnerability is also not significant to explain reserve holdings. Financial 
openness, captured by the sum of all capital and financial account transactions, is positively correlated 
with reserves, as expected, but is not robust. In this sense, early hypothesis that the gradual financial 
integration of Brazil with international flows would explain reserve holdings does not find much ground. 
On the other hand, the possibility of capital flights in the dimension of broad money in Brazil does not 
seem to represent a real concern for the BCB, as the association is negative. Two interpretations follow 
from the exchange rate’s indicators. The rate of deviation of the exchange rate in relation to PPP is not 
significant to explain reserve holdings. This evidence reflects the fact that Brazil has run a free floating 
regime and does not follow a depreciated exchange target that would be more tied up to the reserves 
policy (figure 4).  
  
















































































































































































PPP Effective Rate Deviation   
Source of gross data: www.bcb.gov.br. Right-Y axis for deviations from PPP (in %). 
 
  Meanwhile, the exchange volatility indicator is significant and negative, as theoretically expected 
(the greater flexibility of the exchange rate, the lower the demand for reserves). This result seems 
contradictory at a cursory glance, given Brazil has run a legitimate floating regime and has also increased 
its reserves’ position. Nevertheless, the parameter is capturing the fact the exchange volatility has been 
lower since 2003, explained by the fact that Brazilian economy has not been hit by large capital flights or 
sudden reversals, and also by the large market interventions of the BCB to accumulate stocks of reserves.  
  Consistent with theory, opportunity costs of holding reserves are negatively correlated with 
reserves (figure 5). The result implies that interest rate differentials have followed a downward pattern, as 
seems to be the tendency in the present case. Nevertheless, this result does not imply opportunity costs are 
irrelevant. In fact, BCB has incurred into a high fiscal cost to hold such a large sum of foreign currency, 
and the hypothesis that a window of opportunity has been in place associated to reduced costs for buying 
                                                 
20 The Economist, p.103, May 24th, 2008. 
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foreign currency seems to be groundless in this case. Different from China or Japan, e.g., large 
accumulators of reserves running negative real interest rate, high levels of (nominal and real) interest 
rates have been characteristic in Brazil in this period
21.  
 



























































































































































































Ral differential Nominal differential Reserves  
Source of gross data: www.bcb.gov.br. 
 
  We now develop a benchmark multivariate regression to explore the factors discussed above, 
focusing on the variables related to our investigation among the traditional determinants of the demand 
for international reserves, as discussed previously. Basically, the econometric model incorporates the 
proxies for each of the key factor normally accepted to explain reserve holdings, as follows: 
 
t t t t t
t t t t t t
DIF NOM VA XCHG PPPDEV GDP M
IAF IAC VOL EXP EXP IMP GDP RES
    
      
   
       
_ . _ . . 2 .
. _ . . . .
10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0  (1) 
 
where:  stands for reserves; GDP  is the GDP growth; IMP, total imports; EXP, total exports; 
EXP_VOL, the volatility of export receipts; IAC, trade openness index, the ratio of the sum of total 
imports and exports to GDP; IAF, the financial openness indicator, the ratio of total financial and capital 
account flows to GDP; M2GDP, broad money, the ratio of M2 to GDP; PPPDEV, the deviation of the 
real effective exchange rate from its equilibrium value, based on the PPP; XCHG_VA, the exchange rate 
volatility; and NOM_DIF, for the opportunity cost of holding reserves seized by interest rate differentials. 
All time series were provided by Ipeadata and Central Bank of Brazil, in monthly basis, and were 
seasonally adjusted by the method of the difference from moving average. Time span was defined 
according to the availability of data, starting on December, 1995 until April, 2008 for almost all series, 
which provides a representative sample for the exercises. Series defined in USD million were 
monotonically transformed in logarithms to smooth variations and produce more homogeneous 
coefficients on the equation. We’ve also examine for structural break, given the suspect that the change of 
level related to the strong accumulation of reserves from 2006 up to 2008 could effectively constitute a 
structural break on the time series. We’ve applied the Chow forecast test, which estimates two models – 
one using the full dataset, and the other using a shorter sub-period. If there’s a robust difference between 
the two models, F-statistics and Log Likelihood Ratio tests will identify it, casting doubt on the stability 
of an estimated relation over the sample period. Neither of the forecast tests statistics rejects the null 
hypothesis of no structural change
RS
22. 
Before estimating the parameters of the equation, it’s also fundamental to examine the 
stationarity of the series and formally test for the presence of unit root. The adopted method consisted 
first in identifying the presence of non-stationary and, next, introducing specific solutions. This first step 
was put through the realization of three unit root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron 
                                                 
21 This point will be addressed in the next paper. 
22 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
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(PP) and the method of Zivot-Andrews (ZA)
23. It's also important to examine for autocorrelation on the 
errors on the estimated regression to be sure that the model selected to verify the presence of unit root, is 
correct. Tests were done using the software Eviews 5.0, which generate the critic values to test the null of 
the unit root. We didn’t find serial correlation on the residuals of the model adopted to test for unit root. 
Latu sensu, results are convergent, and series are all either I(0) or, in the majority, I(1). This is not a 
surprise, since the non-stationary dynamism is the rule and not exception among economic time series 
(Fava, 2000). We find
24 that it’s not possible to reject the presence of a unit root for RESERVESA; 
GDPSA; M2GDPSA and NOM_DIFSA. LNIMPORTSA, LNEXPORTSA, IACSA and PPPDEVSA 
were specified as I(1) by ADF and PP tests, and I(0) by ZA. In this case, we consider these series non-
stationary in levels, given the dynamism of the series during the period and the fact that we are not 
controlling each structural breaks ZA suggests to model them in levels. Meanwhile, all specifications 
reject unit root for EXP_VOLSA; IAFSA, and XCHG_VASA
25. This result requires to model equation 
(1) in differences: 
 
t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
DIF NOM
VA XCHG PPPDEV GDP M IAF IAC
VOL EXP EXP IMP GDP RES
 
    
    
 
         
         
) _ ( .
) _ ( . ) ( . ) 2 ( . ) ( . ) ( .
) _ ( . ) ( . ) .( ) ( . ) (
10
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
         (1.a) 
 
  Table 4 presents the identification of the parameters, according to (1.a): 
Table 4: Determinants of Reserve Holdings in Brazil (1995m12-2007m12) 
    I  II III IV V VI 
Economic size                   
GDP  growth  1.41E-06* 1.26E-06* 1.66E-06* 7.45E-07* 7.77E-07* 7.52E-07* 
Current account vulnerability        
Imports  0.009104 0.009581 0.008170  -  -  - 
Trade  Openness  0.001783 0.001614 0.001903  -  -  - 
Export  volatility  0.000240  0.000234  1.79E-05  - - - 
Export    0.039308 0.035074 0.008941  -  -  - 
Current account balance  -  -  -  1.75E-05* 1.76E-05* 1.74E-05* 
Capital account vulnerability        
Financial openness  8.56E-05 8.53E-05 4.90E-05  -  -  - 
Broad  money/GDP  -0.009835 -0.011140 -0.022774  -  -  - 
Short term external debt  -  -  -  0.006523  -  - 
Foreign Portfolio Inflows  -  -  -  0.024810*  0.025171*  0.024840* 
Foreign Other Invest - - -  0.007758*  0.007747*  0.007757* 
Financial  liberalization  - - - -  -0.368295   
Exchange rate flexibility        
Deviation  from  PPP  -0.000243 -0.000252 -0.000422  -  -  - 
Real exchange rate  variation  -0.002799 -0.002791 -0.001858  -  -  - 
Opportunity cost        
Nominal interest differential  -0.00809* -0.00802* -0.00378* -0.00287* -0.00293* -0.00289* 
Others        
Floating  regime  - -  0.002909  - - - 
Outlier  1998m9  -  -  0.305891* 0.141714* 0.135075* 0.141774* 
Outlier  1999m4  -  -  0.274536* 0.137680* 0.138972* 0.137594* 
Contagion  effects  -  -0.005567  - - - - 
Factor for serial correlation  - - -  0.475778*  0.475152*  0.476025* 
Adjusted R-squared  0.134448 0.131254 0.299991 0.648129 0.648997 0.650694 
DW test   2.075428    2.083741   1.906017   2.483889  2.491117  2.484315 
                                                 
23 The Zivot-Andrews unit root test allows for a single endogenously determined break on the time series that is under scrutiny. See Enders 
(2004) for the two first tests and Andrews (1992) for the specification of the ZA test.  
24 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
25 LN stands for logged series, while the suffix SA denotes series were seasonally adjusted. 
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Schwarz   -2.198889    -2.16790    -2.329451   -3.134525   -3.136996    -3.169112 
Notes: number of observations: 147. Models without fixed effects (not significant). 
1: imports, exports and exports volatility lagged 1 
period. *, 5% level of significance; ** for 10%. 
 
A high level of R
2 is not expected, as we do not focus on a forecast to reserves. Therefore, the 
final level of 0.65 for this statistics is acceptable when the concern is to identify the relationships among 
variables. Results of the multiple-variable analysis of the demand for reserves are in line with those of the 
simple correlations and with those in the existing literature
26. As foreshadowed by the simple 
correlations, reserve holdings are positively and significantly related to economic size (GDP), and 
negatively correlated to exchange rate variations and differential of interest rates. Reserves seem not to be 
related to the current account vulnerability’s indicators in regression I, the same occurring with the 
indicators for capital account vulnerability (financial openness and the ratio of broad money to GDP), 
which are also not significantly correlated with reserves. 
                                                
  Regression I is the basic model, when only interest rate differentials and GDP growth are relevant 
explanatory variables at 5% level of significance. F-statistics indicate that at least one of the explanatory 
variables is significant to explain the reserves policy. It’s noteworthy that volatility of the real/dollar 
exchange rate has not constituted a significant explanatory variable for the reserves policy at the 5% level 
in this period. Nevertheless, the negative sign for the parameter indicates an inverse relation between 
exchange rate and reserves. In this case, Central Bank has accumulated reserves during periods of 
exchange appreciation and lost reserves during depreciation periods. Even though relevant only at the 
10% level, the negative coefficient is consistent with the theoretical prediction, suggesting the exchange 
rate flexibility may indeed have substituted reserve holdings to control the exchange market.   
  Aiming to incorporate variables that may have interfered in the reserves pattern and improve the 
adjustment of the model, we have checked the relevance of additional proxies. We tested the necessity to 
control the effects of the Asian and Russian crises. Actually, from May, 1998, until June, 2006, reserves 
had decay more than USD 46 billion. Even though the monetary authority had effectively used such 
amount not just to keep the fixed exchange rate system but also to counterbalance huge capital flights 
mainly in 1998 (when reserves had decreased USD 30 billion), the dummy is not statistically significant 
(regression II). We also conducted omitted variable test, which helps to verify if a set of additional 
variables makes a significant contribution to explaining the variation in the dependent variable (reserves). 
Unit root tests show the variable is not stationary. As reserves is characterized also as I(1), we tested the 
variables in differences. The same conclusion holds, in the sense that it is not possible to reject the null 
that the additional regressor is not significant
27. 
  As between August and September of 1998 there was a huge punctual decrease of roughly USD 
21 billion on reserves, we tested for a pulse dummy at this date. Additionally, another fact is relevant. In 
April, 1999, Brazilian reserves received USD 10 billion from IMF, halting the long decreasing period that 
took place since 1998. We’ve input another pulse variable to control this fact. It is noteworthy that the 
IMF’s funding was vital to recompose the Brazilian external liquidity in that period. We’ve also tested if 
the change of exchange regime in 1999 has been significant for the reserves policy in Brazil. The outliers 
in September, 1998, and in April, 1999 are significant. On the other hand, the introduction of a free 
floating exchange regime does not seem to have altered the pattern of the accumulation of reserve 
holdings in Brazil (regression III). After the turbulence of the initial years of the floating regime, an 
apparent strategy to rebuild foreign reserves seems to have put forward, which rhythm seemed to have 
been similar to the verified during the administered regime in a first moment. Chow breakpoint test does 
not reject the null of no structural change in 1999, supporting this result. Omitted variable test also 
corroborates the results
28. 
  Regression IV in table 4 adds proxies for capital account vulnerability to the explanatory variables 
employed in regression III (an autoregressive component was required to correct for serial 
autocorrelation). Variables are added to capture the policy response to changes in the external financial 
flows and external debt: LNSTEXTDEBTSA, logged short term external debt; LNFRPORTINFSA, the 
 
26 See Flood & Marion (2002) and Aizenman & Marion (2002). 
27 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
28 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
  15 
logged foreign portfolio inflows; and FROTHIVSA, the other investment flows, all seasonally adjusted. 
Results provide evidence that reserves have been calibrated by foreign capital inflows, agreeing with the 
precautionary view. Indeed, foreign portfolio inflows have constituted one important source of 
convertible currency for the Brazilian market after 1995. Short term debt has not been observed, though. 
This result is also plausible if one considers Brazilian short term external debt has been reduced in this 
period and is actually in very low levels, roughly at USD 11 billion. Additionally, foreign portfolio and 
other investment flows are significant added variables, supported by the omitted variables test
29. This 
gives support to the precautionary thesis explaining reserves policy. 
  Regression V tests the most significant variables and adds the current account flows to capture the 
policy response to changes in the status of Brazil’s current account. Over the period 1995-2002m6, Brazil 
recorded current account deficits that amounted to almost 187 billion dollars in total. In sharp contrast, 
however, starting in the second semester of 2002 the current account deficit turned into a surplus and 
remained in surplus until the last quarter of 2007. Over the period 2002-2007, Brazil accumulated a 
current account surplus of more than 45 billion dollars. When the current account is in surplus, a central 
bank is inclined to purchase foreign exchanges to mitigate appreciation pressure on the national currency. 
Regression V identifies a robust correlation between current account balances and the pattern of Brazilian 
reserves, but the mercantilist thesis cannot be supported only based on this evidence. Level of imports and 
exports, the volatility of exports and the grade of trade openness have not been significant in Regression I 
to III. These findings suggest that Brazilian policymakers are not much concerned about either the 
magnitude of export receipts or the grade of trade openness of the economy, based on the assumption that 
the own floating regime will clear transactions while altering the level of the exchange rate. The upward 
movement of exports following the depreciation of the real after 2002 and recently the end of current 
account surpluses in the beginning of 2008 shows that external transactions have been done according to 
a free floating regime.  
Certainly, market interventions of the Central Bank had enlarged the cycle in the sense that it 
avoided a more rapid exchange rate appreciation. However, the mercantilist thesis finds support neither in 
terms of the variables tested in validating the export driver nor in the claim that Brazil runs an 
administered floating regime. This is consistent with the notion elaborated in the previous section, as the 
presence of ‘fear of floating’ is refuted. In this context, the most plausible interpretation for the large 
variation in the country’s level of reserves is that the Central Bank of Brazil is likely to have intervened in 
the foreign exchange market to take advantage of a window of opportunity created by Brazil’s large 
current account surplus. At the same time, its interventions have certainly acted to mitigate more 
pronounced exchange rate volatility, given the huge amount involved in steady interventions especially 
throughout 2006 and 2007. Instead, they have not prevented real appreciation of the real, vis-à-vis the 
deviations of the exchange rate from its equilibrium does not explain the reserves policy. Different from 
many Asian countries, Brazil cannot be considered manipulating the exchange rate to maintain 
international competitiveness.  
  A proxy to test for financial liberalization (ICC1, logged) is also included. Early hypothesis in this 
work has been that the gradual process of financial liberalization that took place in Brazil since the 1990s 
required the Central Bank of Brazil to adopt high level of reserves as the instrument for the external 
management of the country, in a precautionary basis. As Rodrik (2006) recognizes, ‘market intervention’ 
in the form of taxing short-term capital inflows has developed an unsavory reputation that ‘market 
intervention’ in the form of buying reserves does not have. So, a link of reserves to financial liberalization 
seems to be plausible. Even more, chronological order of financial liberalization and then the more 
relevant accumulation of reserves also helped to sustain this interpretation. However, results are not 
supportive to this statement. Even though not significant, the coefficient is negative, in the opposite 
expected direction. In this context, it’s more probable that these events are not strongly linked. Even 
more, as the link of financial openness to reserves is also not robust, the great exchange transactions of 
Brazil with abroad have not implied per se high levels of reserves. Given financial transactions tend to 
clear themselves in the market, one interpretation for this fact is that the monetary authority does not need 
to controls capital flows anymore. In this case, reserves are not supposed to be a substitute for previous 
                                                 
29 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
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capital controls, being much more related to concerns related to the capital sudden stops or reversals. The 
free floating exchange rate has been the natural mechanism to clear and manage external transactions, 
even though this greater instability may impose side effects to the level of activity of the domestic 
economy.  
  Regression VI drops the explanatory variables with insignificant estimated coefficients, and the 
remaining ones were corrected for heteroskedascity on the stochastic disturbances using the White’s 
consistent covariance matrix estimator. All components presented parameters statistically identified at 5% 
level, and DW statistic indicates no serial correlation on residuals on the model. Classical assumptions 
related to the stochastic component are all valid in this specification, allowing for more statistically robust 
results. It’s quite intriguing the result governing reserves and interest rates. On the one hand, it’s true that 
the Central Bank of Brazil runs an inflation target system as the core of the economic policy in Brazil 
since 1999, and high levels of nominal and real interest rates in Brazil have been common and subjected 
to massive critics among Brazilian economists. On the other hand, the parameter for differentials of 
interest rates is positive and significant. In fact, differentials on the opportunity cost of holding reserves 
has decreased in this period
30, even though the absolute level of interest rates in Brazil is still one of the 
highest in terms of international levels. In this context, we cannot discharge that the reduction of the 
opportunity cost has allowed a greater accumulation of foreign currency in Brazil.    
  Summing up, regressions shows that the main drivers of the increase in reserves are the rising 
GDP of the country, current account balances, foreign portfolio and other investments flows and 
differential of interest rates. The change of exchange regime has not changed the attitude towards reserve 
holdings. After a period of decay following the financial turmoil in 1999, the monetary authority restarted 
to accumulate reserves in an attempt to mitigate the external exposure of the nation. The change has come 
to exist much later, by changing international reserves in tandem with a window of opportunity related to 
the current account surpluses. As discussed above, it seems that the Central Bank is playing a much more 
passive role in the external front. Even though current and capital account surpluses have been in fact the 
determinants to increase international reserves allowing excess of foreign exchange liquidity on the 
Brazilian market, the Central Bank of Brazil’s market intervention on the demand side does not seem to 
have been used to sustain the country’s international competitiveness. While this process of accumulating 
reserve holdings may have decreased the perceived vulnerability of the country to external shocks, 
culminating in the upgrade of the government bonds to investment grade in May of 2008, the mercantilist 
thesis does not exhibit any sign of playing a more determinant role on the reserves policy. De facto, 
monetary authority’s market interventions do not seem to have imposed enough incentives to alter the 
current external flows and preserve or expand export competitiveness.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The paper has investigated the rationale behind the monetary authority’s exchange market 
interventions and the parallel accumulation of foreign reserves in Brazil. Different from the majority of 
East Asian and Latin American countries, data reviewed in section 3 is consistent with the interpretation 
that the exchange fluctuations in Brazil have not constituted a priority concern to the Brazilian authorities. 
This finding is similar to Souza & Hoff’s work (2003). Indeed, prolonged real appreciation of the 
domestic currency does not seem to explain the market interventions by the monetary authorities, vis-à-
vis it helps to sustain inflation close to targets, the real institutional mission of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
As monetary authorities’ market interventions do not seem to be related to ‘fear of floating’ concerns, this 
finding is in contrast with the mercantilist view that Brazil manages its foreign exchange rate. 
The main finding is that the monetary authority interventions in the foreign exchange market and 
the parallel policy of reserve holdings cannot be supported by the mercantilist thesis. Variables correlated 
to that perspective have not been statistically significant to explain the Central Bank of Brazil’s market 
interventions (section 4). Besides, our investigation shows that exchange market interventions and reserve 
holdings have not been used to sustain either an unofficial exchange target regime or the country’s 
exports competitiveness (section 4). Brazil seems to have run a genuine free floating regime since 1999 
(section 3). The introduction of the effective free floating exchange regime in 1999 does not seem to be 
                                                 
30 Figures, estimations and main results are available upon request. 
  17 
relevant in explaining the actual Brazilian external policy. Our results also suggest that the reserves policy 
has not changed with the introduction of the de facto free floating exchange regime in 1999, as 
theoretically expected. After a period of decay following the financial turmoil in 1999, the monetary 
authority restarted to accumulate reserves in an attempt to mitigate the external exposure of the nation. 
This change happened much later in 2005, when a window of opportunity created conditions to increase 
the level of reserves.  
Government policy regarding the level of the exchange rate and reserve holdings in Brazil cannot 
be linked to an active export-led growth policy. International competitiveness does not appear to have 
been particularly significant in explaining the rationale of the Brazilian external policy. Even though 
current and capital account surpluses have provided the excess of liquidity to increase international 
reserves, the Central Bank of Brazil’s market intervention on the demand side does not seem to have been 
used to sustain the country’s international competitiveness. While this process of accumulating reserve 
holdings may have decreased the perceived vulnerability of the country to external shocks, culminating in 
the upgrade of the government bonds to investment grade in May 2008, the mercantilist thesis does not 
constitute a robust determinant for the monetary authority’s external policy. Even though the current 
account balance has been significant to explain reserves holdings, the monetary authority’s market 
interventions do not appear to have imposed enough incentives to alter the current external flows and 
preserve or expand export competitiveness. The work of Araujo & De Negri (2007) completely 
corroborates with this conclusion.  
Additionally, financial integration does not seem to have demanded higher levels of reserves, 
while financial deregulation does not explain the building of reserves in Brazil. Here it appears that the 
higher turnover of the exchange market has been sufficient to clear the transactions, without providing 
additional levels of reserves. This means the actual higher levels of reserves cannot be explained due to 
the higher turnover in the foreign exchange market. At the same time, the gradual financial liberalization 
process in Brazil has not been significantly connected to the reserves policy. In this case, early hypothesis 
that the Central Bank of Brazil counts with additional levels of foreign reserves, to compensate the 
shortage of mechanisms to control unbalanced external financial flows, does not hold. Despite difficulty 
in identifying a strong correlation between these variables, it seems plausible to suggest that international 
reserves should have the ability to mitigate the probability of output collapses (which are induced by 
sudden stops or capital flights during a financial turmoil). Actually they replace capital controls that 
would be useful to curb large capital unbalances and reduce the probability of financial crises. 
Our regressions suggest that the imports rule has not lately governed the market interventions 
policy. The current legal rule addressing reserves to be pegged to the imports level does not explain the 
actual pattern of reserve holdings. In this case, imports level may matter today less than would be thought 
in a scenario of excess of liquidity. As the level of reserves has been much higher than the level the legal 
rule prescribes, other concerns, relative, e.g., to capital flights or sudden stops, may matter more. The 
imports rule aside, the precautionary thesis is still liable to explain reserve holdings in Brazil, even though 
not related to the current account transactions. Indeed, while current account surpluses had provided part 
of the proceeds to the enlargement of reserves, reserves have not influenced them, in the Granger sense. 
At the same time, since the monetary authority’s interventions have not been linked to the current account 
balance, this evidence is also a claim against the mercantilist approach. As Brazil runs a genuine free 
floating regime, the exchange rate mechanism appears to be the main determinant to explain the current 
account results. Alternatively, the rationale for market interventions and reserve holdings seems actually 
to be linked to the level of foreign financial inflows, in a precautionary basis. The actual context of 
deregulated and volatile capitals that may move abroad quickly may require the Central Bank of Brazil’s 
interventions to reduce the instability in the exchange market during a financial turmoil. As large foreign 
capital inflows had also constituted one of the main sources for reserve holdings in Brazil, it seems 
sensible that the monetary authority may hold reserves in tandem with the volume of these unstable flows. 
Macroeconomic stability involves to taming unbalanced capital flows in the exchange market, if 
necessary. Capital can suddenly flow out, as it did during the Asian crisis a decade ago and in Vietnam 
this year
31. That’s the precautionary basis for the Brazilian reserve holdings. For such, developments in 
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the external policy should be seen against the background of a general enlargement of the balance of 
payments providing an excess of liquidity in the period under review, especially after 2003, mainly 
related to the exogenous (and inherently unstable) dynamism of capital flows.  
Yet, a precautionary based reserves policy involves welfare concerns. This differs from the 
mercantilist approach, which views the level of international reserves as residual, and is not concerned 
with associated fiscal costs. Instead, the precautionary demand view attempts to identify of an ‘optimal’ 
stock of international reserves, as interest rates have been significant for determining reserve holdings. In 
this case, we cannot discount the claim that the reduction of the opportunity cost has allowed greater 
accumulation of foreign currency in Brazil. If differentials of interest rate were higher than actually 
verified, reserves would have been kept in lower levels. Nevertheless, even though the opportunity costs 
of holding reserves have decreased in this period, absolute levels of interest rates in Brazil are still one of 
the highest in international terms. This means that Brazil still runs high associated fiscal costs. The 
question that follows is this, are the associated costs higher or lower than the expected benefits derived 
from this policy? Identifying the effects and examining the costs and benefits of holding large sums of 
foreign reserves remains a task for future research.  
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